New Technology in Schools: Is There a Payoff? * Despite its high relevance to current policy debates, estimating the causal effect of Information Communication Technology (ICT) investment on educational standards remains fraught with difficulties. In this paper, we exploit a change in the rules governing ICT funding across different school districts of England to devise an instrumental variable strategy to identify the causal impact of ICT expenditure on pupil outcomes. The approach identifies the effect of being a 'winner' or a 'loser' in the new system of ICT funding allocation to schools. Our findings suggest a positive impact on primary school performance in English and Science, though not for Mathematics. We reconcile our positive results with others in the literature by arguing that it is the joint effect of large increases in ICT funding coupled with a fertile background for making an efficient use of it that led to positive effects of ICT expenditure on educational performance in English primary schools.
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Introduction
Among policymakers it is widely believed that Information and Communication Technology (ICT) investment can have an important role to play in raising educational standards. The view that ICT can help improve pupil achievement dates back at least as far as the Fifties, and builds on some of the original findings of Skinner (1954 Skinner ( , 1958 , who claimed that new technologies in schools could make learning more efficient. In more recent years, and in parallel with the widespread view that new technologies account for much of the productivity resurgence in the Nineties (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000) , there has been growing interest in the use of computers in the classroom.
The UK government has motivated its sizable ICT investment in schools by stressing the importance of ICT in improving education levels. Recently the Secretary of State for Education has spoken of ICT as 'crucial to our drive to raise standards'. 1 It is envisaged that ICT should be widely used across the whole school curriculum, in all publicly funded schools (DfES, 2003; Ofsted, 2001 ). The positive rhetoric about ICT in the UK has been backed up by considerable government investment. Between 1998 and 2002, ICT expenditure in England almost doubled in secondary schools (from an average of about £40,100 to just under £75,300 per school, or around 3 percent of overall expenditure) and increased by over 300 percent in primary schools (from £3,600 in 1998 to £12,900 in 2002, or about 2 percent of overall expenditure).
Is this a good use of public money? Some support for the effectiveness of ICT as a teaching and learning device comes from educational and psychological research. Yet a recent review by Kirkpatrick and Cuban (1998) suggests that evidence for the effectiveness of ICT in schools is both limited and mixed. Most importantly, results are generally inferred from a simple correlation between ICT and pupil performance, which casts serious doubt on the validity of findings. Starting with the study by Angrist and Lavy (2002) , there has been a small number of economic studies that address this issue and apply more rigorous methods of analysis: none of them, with exception of 1 Ruth Kelly, Speech to BETT, the annual educational technology show, London 2005.
2 Banerjee et al. (2004) (on schools in Indian urban slums), shows evidence of a positive causal relationship between computers (and/or computer software) and pupil performance.
In this paper, we look at the relationship between changes in ICT investment and changes in educational outcomes in England. To do so, we mainly rely on administrative data at the level of the Local Education Authority 2 from 1999 to 2003. To deal with potential endogeneity problems relating to ICT use and pupil achievement, we exploit a policy change that occurred in 2001 from which we devise an instrumental variable strategy to identify the causal impact of ICT expenditure.
Specifically, we consider how a change in the rules governing ICT funding led to changes in ICT investment and subsequently changed educational outcomes. This approach therefore identifies the effect of being a 'winner' or a 'loser' in the new system of ICT allocation to schools. Finally, we draw on insights from a school survey about ICT use in English schools to interpret our findings.
Unlike previous studies in the economic literature, we find evidence for a positive causal impact of ICT investment on educational performance in primary schools. This is most evident in English test scores, where we also show evidence that there is high use of ICT for teaching purposes. Additionally, we find a positive, but less robust, effect on Science test scores, while we fail to detect any impact on achievement in Mathematics. We reconcile our positive results with others in the literature by arguing that it is the joint effect of large increases in ICT funding coupled with a fertile background for making an efficient use of it that led to positive effects of ICT expenditure on educational performance in English primary schools.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief review of the economic literature on computers and education. In Section 3, we discuss how ICT (mainly computers) is used in English schools and describe the changing policy context. In Section 4, we 3 outline our identification strategy, before discussing results in Section 5. We draw together our conclusions in Section 6.
Literature on the Effect of Computers in Schools
As discussed by Angrist and Lavy (2002) , the educational use of computers generally falls under two broad headings: computer skills training, which teaches students how to use computers, and
Computer-Aided Instruction (CAI), which uses computers to teach things that may or may not have any relation to technology. While basic familiarity with the former seems undeniably useful, the role of CAI is more controversial.
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Some empirical support for the effectiveness of CAI comes from the educational and psychology literature. Yet, the review provided in Kirkpatrick and Cuban (1998) , suggests that the evidence for the effectiveness of ICT in schools is, at best, mixed. More importantly, the authors cast serious doubt on the methodological approach of existing studies. Evidence for the English experience in recent years is reported in Becta (2002) and Ofsted (2001) , and similarly points to a positive link between high standards across the curriculum and ICT use in schools. However, as for most of the studies reviewed by Kirkpatrick and Cuban (1998) , results are generally inferred from a simple positive correlation between ICT and pupil performance.
However the use of computer and teaching software may well be correlated with other inputs to education, which are unobserved or imperfectly measured and that contemporaneously affect performance and technology. This gives rise to serious concern about the validity of the findings. In fact, this problem is well illustrated in the recent study by Fuchs and Woessman (2004) , which uses international data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA).
The authors show that while the simple bivariate correlation between the availability of computers 4 at school and school performance is strongly and significantly positive, this becomes small and insignificant when other school characteristics are taken into account. This suggests that establishing whether computers have a causal impact requires experimental or quasi-experimental evidence, where a 'treatment' and 'control' group can be properly defined. Angrist and Lavy (2002) is the first study in this vein. They use the fact that the Israeli State lottery funded a large-scale computerization effort in many elementary and middle schools to facilitate a controlled comparison between schools that received funding and schools that did not receive funding. They find no evidence that increased educational use of computers raised pupil test scores. Leuven et al. (2004) also use a government scheme -this time in The Netherlands -to evaluate the effect of computers (and software) on pupil outcomes in a quasi-experimental setting.
Their conclusions similarly suggest that the extra funds for computers and software did not have a positive impact on pupils' achievement. In the same spirit, Goolsbee and Guryan (2005) analyze the effect of a program in the US to subsidize schools' investment in Internet and communications.
While they do not have a quasi-experimental setting, the authors try to isolate the program's effect from underlying trends, mainly by exploiting a regression discontinuity design. Although the program led to an increase in Internet connections, they find no impact on any measure of pupil achievement. Finally, Rouse et al. (2004) present results from a truly randomized study of a popular instructional computer program designed to improve language and reading skills in the US. Their estimates also suggest that the use of computer programs do not significantly help improve measures of language acquisition and reading skills.
An important exception to the body of work that reports no effects is Banerjee et al. (2004) .
Their analysis presents the results of a randomized policy evaluation administered in India, aimed at improving the quality of education in urban slums. The authors find that a computer assisted program, designed to reinforce mathematical skills, had a large and positive impact on math scores.
Although these results can hardly be compared to findings from studies in developed countries 5 (where the educational context is so different), the authors are the first to show (in a causal sense) that CAI may have the potential to improve the educational achievement of disadvantaged children.
In summary, the small number of studies addressing the 'endogeneity' issue report little evidence of a positive relationship between the use of computers and/or computer software and educational performance. This suggests that the use of CAI in schools to teach language and mathematical skills is not effective on average (and certainly not cost-effective); in fact, it may be inferior to teaching methods that are being replaced by technology. In the remainder of this paper, we consider these important, policy relevant issues in the context of the English school system.
ICT in English Schools
In 1997 the UK government announced plans to encourage the widespread application of ICT to teaching and learning in maintained schools. 4 The intention was to equip schools with modern ICT facilities, create a national framework with educational information and study material, and organize in-service training programs for teachers and school librarians (Ofsted, 2001) . A target for the computer-pupil ratio was also set, with the aim of achieving a ratio of 1:8 in primary schools Nevertheless, for the schools in the sample, in the allocation mechanism -the rationale being to make the system more equitable. From then on, allocations were made according to a formula based on school and pupil numbers in LEAs and an adjustment made for population density.
The change in the allocation mechanism created winners and losers among LEAs. In Figure   3 , we plot the log share of total ICT funding received by each LEA before and after the policy change. We also plot the corresponding 'fitted share' of ICT funding, based on pupil numbers, school numbers and population density in the LEA. After the policy change the correspondence between the actual and fitted share is close. Before the policy change, there is considerable divergence between the actual and fitted share -showing that the ICT funding allocation to LEAs was not made on the same basis before and after the policy change. 8 Hence some LEAs gained from the new system, but others lost -the magnitude of the gain or loss can be measured by the difference between the share of funding received by the LEA in the new system relative to the share it received in the old system.
A further illustration of the effect of the rule change in 2001 can be seen in Figure 4 , which shows trends in ICT funding per pupil (indexed at 1 in 1999) over time for two groups of LEAs:
those which were at or below the 25 th percentile of the ICT expenditure per pupil distribution in 1999; and those which were at or above the 75 th percentile. The graph shows that among the two groups, the relative 'winners' were LEAs at the lower part of the distribution in 1999, which 9 benefited from massive increases in ICT funds after the policy change (they had an average growth rate of about 50 percent per year).
In Table 3 , we also use the ICT school survey to examine how schools in these two Table 3 ), where the rate of increase in ICT expenditure per pupil is only slightly higher for schools in 'bottom LEAs' than 'top LEAs' and the rate of increase in the computer-pupil ratio is lower in 'bottom LEAs'. This may reflect the fact (discussed above) that for secondary schools ICT expenditure per pupil has not increased over time as much as in primary schools and that ICT-specific funding from LEAs appears to be less important as a source of overall ICT expenditure.
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To conclude, the key features of the policy change that are important for the analysis are as follows: the basis for the funding allocation was very different in the old and new system; the change created 'winners' and 'losers'; the change had a larger impact on primary schools than on secondary schools. 10 In our analysis, we will use the magnitude of gain or loss as a result of the change in system, combined with the timing of the change, to predict changes in ICT funding at 9 There are no rules for how LEAs allocate ICT funding to schools: 'they have the freedom to manage allocations at a local level in order to meet local priorities ' (DfES, 2004) . 10 The change was not pre-empted by LEAs in how they were bidding for funding the year before the rule changed. This seems very unlikely; in fact, the funding share in the two pre-change years, 1999 and 2000, is very highly correlated.
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LEA level. We argue that this provides an exogenous source of variation in ICT funding that can be used to analyze its impact on educational outcomes, overcoming potential endogeneity problems.
Analytical Framework and Identification
Because our identification strategy is based on a rule change at LEA level, we rely on data at this level of aggregation to devise an Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy. We construct an LEA-level panel using administrative data over the 1999-2003 period. 11 Information includes ICT funding; pupil performance; other LEA funding to schools; and LEA characteristics, such as the number of schools and pupils.
We know the rule change created 'winners' and 'losers' among LEAs. The magnitude of gain or loss can be measured by the difference between the share in overall expenditure received by the LEA in the year prior to the policy change and the share after the policy change. 12 We argue that this provides us with an exogenous source of variation to predict the growth rate of ICT funding per pupil after the policy change. Hence our first-stage regression is:
where it C ∆ is the change in log(ICT funding per pupil) for LEA i in time t;
is a measure of 'gain' or 'loss' incurred by LEA i as a consequence of the change in the allocation mechanism in the years after the change (t≥2001); i ξ is an LEA fixed effect potentially capturing its relative position in the ICT funding distribution, before the policy change; t φ is a set of year fixed effects; it X ∆ is a vector of changes in inputs (in logs) expected to affect ICT funding per pupil at the LEAlevel; and it ω is an error term.
11 There are various data constraints at school-level. For example, one needs to rely on retrospective information to construct changes in the computer/pupil ratio for schools. We do not have retrospective information on ICT expenditure per pupil. The school-level surveys are repeated cross sections, where very few schools are sampled more than once. 12 It does not make much difference whether we use 1999 or 2000 data to calculate the share of ICT funding allocated to a particular LEA. There is a strong correlation between the shares allocated to LEAs in both these years.
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The second stage regression can be written as follows: Index itself. This allows us to control for LEA fixed effects and hence remove this potential source of endogeneity from our instrument. Thus, we include in our regressions (both first and second stage) a full battery of LEA dummies. Our identification strategy is similar to the non-linear IV approach followed by Angrist and Lavy (2002) .
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Notice that the validity of our identification strategy hinges on the possibility of controlling for LEA unobservable characteristics affecting ICT funding per pupil, as well as other educational inputs and outputs, by using LEA fixed effects over the period of analysis. Yet, our strategy would be flawed if i Index were picking up longer pre-policy trends, affecting how LEAs respond to the policy change and adjust to the new equilibrium, both in terms of inputs and output.
12 Therefore, in Index , to directly analyze the relationship between pre-policy trends and our instrument. As shown in
Columns 3 and 4, we are not able to detect a significant relationship between our instrument and the pre-policy trends.
14 Further, Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of the relationship between LEA funding per pupil and being a 'winner' or a 'loser' on account of the policy change. The graph shows that total expenditure per pupil (in real terms) fell almost constantly between 1992/1993 and 1999/2000, before the policy change. 15 Yet, the trend for winners and losers shows a very similar pattern. It moves in parallel for 'winners' and 'losers' throughout this period. Importantly for our analysis, the trend is identical in the few years prior to the policy change. This is highly reassuring for the validity of our IV strategy.
14 Notice that we also tested whether Index i is related to a number of observable LEA characteristics before the period under analysis, including the number of crimes and teenage pregnancies, mean household income and young unemployment claims, all in 1999. We find no significant relationship between these variables and our instrument. This provides additional evidence as to the validity of our strategy. 15 Notice that, in nominal terms, expenditure per pupil has been constantly growing over the period under analysis. The total nominal growth rate for England was about 6%, between 1992/1993 and 1999/2000, and 27% between 1999/2000 and 2002/2003. 13
One might ask whether instrumenting for the change in ICT funding is really necessary when estimating regressions at LEA level. For example, it could be argued that there is exogenous variation in the growth of ICT funding as this is largely determined by central government; or that, with such aggregate data, unobserved attributes of pupils or schools that are correlated with the growth of ICT funding and with educational outcomes may not be so important. There are two main reasons for an IV approach in this context. Firstly, the measure of ICT funding is only a proxy for ICT investment at school-level; in Section 3, we have described how ICT-specific funding is just a fraction of overall ICT expenditure in schools. The fact that we may be measuring changes in the true ICT input with error could lead to downward bias in our estimate of the effect of ICT investment on educational outcomes. 16 Secondly, because LEAs must provide matched funding to 'ICT-specific' grants, the level of LEA funding (and relevant school expenditure) will reflect the extent to which LEAs prioritize ICT investments; growing ICT expenditure may come at the cost of a reduction in other forms of investments, i.e. crowding out non-ICT specific LEA expenditure.
This adds a further non-random dimension to ICT funding observed at LEA level, which may be correlated with educational outcomes. If LEA priorities change over time, this effect will not be removed with the inclusion of LEA fixed effects. Yet, provided our instrument is orthogonal to the dynamics of other (non-ICT) LEA expenditure, the IV approach will still isolate the effect of additional ICT investment in schools on pupils' achievement. In Table A1 of the Appendix, we show some evidence that ICT funding is crowding out other types of LEA funding, since there is a negative relationship between ICT funding per pupil and other LEA funding per pupil. However the instrument used in our analysis is unrelated to non-ICT funding per pupil at the LEA level.
There is therefore a strong rationale for instrumenting the change in ICT funding, even when analyzing relationships at the LEA level. We then identify an average causal response (ACR) of educational achievement to changes in the funding mechanism. The ACR is defined by Angrist and 16 Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) show this to be a problem that is exacerbated in a longitudinal context.
Imbens (1995) as a generalization of the local average treatment effect (LATE) when the treatment
is not binary. In our case, the treatment intensity varies between LEAs, and is proportional to the losses or gains experienced by LEAs as a result of the change in the funding mechanism. Therefore, the ACR will depend on the distribution of treatment intensities across LEAs: big 'losers' or big 'winners' from the change in system will have a disproportionate effect on the IV estimate.
Results
First Stage Regressions
Regressions are based on administrative data at LEA level for the years 1999-2003. All variables are specified as changes in logs, except for Table 5 . In Column 1, we show the relationship between the instrument and the change in ICT funding per pupil, controlling for LEA unobservable trends by using a full set of LEA dummies, as well as a set of year dummies. Then, in Column 2, we also include controls for variables used to allocate ICT funds to LEAs in the post-reform period (sparsity; pupil numbers; school numbers) and controls for the pupil-teacher ratio. 17 Finally, in Column 3, we include i Index (rather than LEA dummies) to control for LEA specific trends and to save degrees of freedom (this of course makes very little difference at all since it is only because time-varying controls are included that the coefficient on Index*Policy-on is not identical in Columns 2 and 3).
The key parameter of interest is the estimated coefficient on Index*Policy-on, which is positive and highly significant in all specifications. The reported F statistics are well above the critical values suggested in Staiger and Stock (1997) to detect weak instruments; also, the marginal R-squared for the excluded instrument suggests Index*Policy-on can account for a large proportion 15 of the variation observed in the growth rate of ICT after the policy change. Finally, an interpretation of the coefficient is that if the rule change led to an increase of about 10 percent in the relative share of ICT funding received by an LEA, this would mean a 9 percentage point increase in ICT funding per pupil within that LEA.
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In Table 6 , we report similar specifications at school-level since it is important to know whether the instrument has some power at this level, and to see whether the impact is different for primary than for secondary schools. In this case, the dependent variable is the computer-pupil ratio and is based on retrospective data in the ICT Survey (where schools are asked about the number of computers used for teaching at the present time and three years previously; similar questions are not asked about ICT expenditure). Some additional school-level controls are included (percentage of students eligible for free school meals; percentage of students with Special Educational Needs). The instrument is positive and significant for primary schools, though it is much less powerful than in regressions specified at the LEA level. 19 In this case, a 10 percent increase in the share of ICT funding received by an LEA leads to an increase in the computer-pupil ratio of about 0.11 percentage points. 20 In contrast, the estimated coefficient is zero for secondary schools. Given the discussion in Section 3, it is perhaps not surprising to see that the IV strategy has no power in this case. Hence, in the second stage of our analysis, we focus exclusively on primary school outcomes.
The Effect of ICT Funding on Educational Outcomes
In England, compulsory education is organized into 4 Key Stages (KS1 to 4) and national tests (which are externally set and marked) are taken at the end of each Key Stage for pupils of age 7, 11, 18 Remember that our instrument is the difference between the actual logarithmic share of ICT funding accruing to an LEA in 2000, and the log share of funds computed applying the formula for 2000 (see Figure 3 , bottom panel). It therefore measures the change in the relative position in the distribution of ICT funds across LEAs. 19 In this specification, the dependent variable varies at the school level, while the instrument is fixed within LEAs. As a result, the F statistic is not asymptotically equivalent to the square of the t statistic on Index*Policy-on. This helps in explaining the much weaker explanatory power of our exclusion restriction in the school level models. 20 The estimated coefficient at the school level is different to that at the LEA level. Apart from the fact that the measure of ICT is different, there are a number of possible reasons for this: schools only partly rely on ICT-specific funding for ICT-related expenditure; only a fraction of ICT expenditure is used to buy computers; the LEA may use ICT-specific funding to finance joint activities (e.g. teacher training); the change in computers per pupil is computed over two periods, while our instrument is mainly capturing changes occurring between 2000 and 2001.
16 14 and 16 respectively. The test at age 11 is taken at the end of primary school (KS2). Marks for each test are converted into a level on a scale of 2-6, where 'level 4' is the standard deemed appropriate at this stage of education. The educational knowledge and skills required at each level is set out in the National Curriculum. Government targets for pupils of age 11 are based around the percentage of pupils that attain 'level 4' or above. Hence, this is the measure of performance recorded in the School Performance Tables and used in our analysis (at LEA level).
In the three Panels of Table 7 We address these points in Table 8 Table 7 mainly capture an effect of the policy emerging in the period 2002-2003, which is estimated to be as large as for English. We find no significant positive impact of ICT on Maths scores.
Finally, since our regressions are based on a five year LEA panel, we also address the possibility of serial correlation which may spuriously increase the precision of our estimates. To do so, we follow the methodology of Bertrand et al. (2004) and collapse the data to just two observations per LEA -one before and one after the policy change. When we do this, we still find a positive and significant impact of ICT investment on English achievement (coefficient 0.023, significant at the 5 percent level) and a marginally significant effect on Science grades (0.019, significant at the 10 percent level); and no impact for Mathematics.
Interpretation of the Findings
The evidence discussed so far suggests that, in the English context, where a policy change in 2001
induced large relative changes in ICT funding, ICT expenditure has led to significant improvements in school performance in English and Science tests at age 11, though not for Mathematics. How can we reconcile our evidence with previous studies in the field that find no effect?
The IV estimates presented in this paper identify the average causal response (ACR) of educational achievement to changes in the funding mechanism. ACR is a generalization of the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) when the treatment is not binary (see Angrist and Imbens, 1995) . It depends on the distribution of treatment intensities across LEAs, with big 'losers' or big 'winners' disproportionately affecting the IV estimates. In fact, we know that for big 'winners'
(LEAs in the top quartile of our Index i distribution) the average annual growth rate of ICT funds was about 50 percent after the policy change (i.e. over [2001] [2002] [2003] as compared to a much smaller change of 20 percent for big 'losers' (LEAs in the bottom quartile of the Index i distribution).
Intuitively, it is the comparison between these two groups, and the associated change in the allocation of ICT funds, that drives identification of the impact of ICT on educational outcomes.
To further illustrate this, we implement the method of Angrist and Imbens (1995) , which allows identification of those LEAs that contributed most to the estimates of the ACR, in terms of acceleration in their ICT funding. To keep it as simple as possible, we make use of a binary version of our instrument: this takes the value one when Index i is positive or zero (i.e. for 'winners'), and the value zero when Index i is negative (i.e. for 'losers'). Our IV results are fully confirmed when this version of the instrument is used. ACR estimates should be interpreted as the weighted average impact of a 1 percent change in the growth rate of ICT funding, for LEAs affected by the policy change. For each level of the growth rate of ICT funding, say j, the weighting function is proportional to the fraction of LEAs that went from ICT funding below j to ICT funding above this level, as a result of the policy change. So, which LEAs are weighted more in our ACR estimates?
A simple and informative answer can be provided graphically, analyzing the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the growth rate of ICT separately for winners and losers (as defined by whether Index is positive or negative), after the policy change; computations are carried out over the common support of the ICT funding. 24 Results are depicted in the top panel of Figure 5 . The difference between the two CDFs, at each point j of the ICT funding distribution, is a function capturing the contribution (i.e. the weight) of that point to the ACR estimate. This is plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 6 , with associated standard errors. Furthermore, it seems that LEAs benefiting most from the policy change were LEAs with lower overall expenditure per pupil, but better educational standards (as measured by exam pass rates and truancy rates), suggesting that resources were redirected to areas that were in a better position to use them efficiently. 25 Additionally, evidence discussed in Section 3 suggests that new technology was already in place in English schools since the mid-Nineties, and that money redirected after the policy change was mainly spent in updating resources and teachers' skills.
To summarize, in the English case, it appears to be the joint effect of large increases in ICT funding and a fertile background for making an efficient use of it, that led to positive effects of ICT expenditure on educational performance. This helps to reconcile our results with the most recent evidence in Goolsbee and Guryan (2005) . In their case, funding was diverted to the most disadvantaged areas and, as they admit, there are doubts about whether resources were actually used, not least because teachers were "novice or completely inexperienced with computers" (page 24). Additionally, while their analysis deals with the impact of internet access in schools, we study the impact of overall ICT expenditure. We have provided evidence that almost all our schools were fully equipped with internet access for the period under analysis. This suggests that investment may have been concentrated in more effective areas, such as teacher training and support.
Finally, we provide one further remark about the interpretation of our estimates. Evidence in Table A1 suggests that our estimates are virtually free from crowding out effects that ICT expenditure may have on other type of educational expenditure. In fact, the relationship between (the instrumented growth rate of) ICT expenditure and other LEA funds is both statistically 21 insignificant, and small (bearing in mind that full crowding out would correspond to a coefficient of -1). This suggests that our findings should be interpreted as pertaining to the effect of extra resources invested in ICT, holding constant other inputs.
Conclusion
It is difficult to firmly establish a causal relationship between computers and educational outcomes and there are only a small number of studies in the economic literature which try to do so. With the exception of the rather different Banerjee et al. (2004) paper on schools in Indian urban slums, they all find no evidence of a positive relationship between computers (and computer related inputs) and educational performance. In this study, we examine the issue in an English context, where there has been a major increase in Information Communication Technology (ICT) investment since 1998.
We examine the relationship between changes in ICT investment and changes in educational performance in Local Education Authorities (LEAs). We overcome the 'endogeneity' problem by making use of a change in the rules about how ICT funds were allocated to different LEAs. Hence, we follow studies that use a quasi-experimental setting to estimate the effect of a given treatment status. In this case, the 'treatment' is measured continuously and reflects the magnitude of the gain or loss experienced by different LEAs as a result of the change in the funding system. In contrast with most previous studies in the economic literature, we find evidence for a positive impact of ICT investment on educational performance in primary schools. A positive effect is observed for English and Science, though not for Mathematics. Hence it seems that, in a context where there was a significant expansion of ICT investment, one can uncover evidence of an improvement in pupil achievement linked to ICT. This provides an interesting parallel to the existing work that does not find beneficial effects for pupils and to the related work on firms where there is evidence that ICT investment enhances firm productivity. 
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Notes: Table reports 1992/1993 1993/1994 1994/1995 1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000 Notes: Index is an LEA based indicator defined as the fitted log share of ICT funding minus actual log share, in 1999/2000. Standard errors clustered at the LEA level in parentheses: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Outlier schools have been excluded (schools in the top or bottom 1% of either the computer per pupil or expenditure per pupil distribution). The ICT variable comes from ICT School Survey. Other school-level variables come from the School Performance Tables and the Annual School Census. Controls include the log-change of the number of pupils, pupil/teacher ratio, fraction of pupils with special educational needs, fraction of pupils eligible for free school meals (varying at the school level), and a sparsity factor (varying at the LEA level). Notes: Index is an LEA based indicator defined as the fitted log share of ICT funding minus actual log share, in 1999/2000. Standard errors clustered at the LEA level in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the number of pupils in the LEA. Controls include a sparsity factor and the log-change of the number of pupils, number of schools and pupil/teacher ratio; all varying at the LEA level. 1999-2000 vs.2002-2003 Notes: Standard errors clustered at the LEA level in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Regressions are weighted by the number of pupils in the LEA. Controls include a sparsity factor and the log-change of the number of pupils, number of schools and pupil/teacher ratio; all varying at the LEA level. Regressions also include Index to control for LEA specific trends. Notes: Instrument is a binary version of Index: 1 for Winners (non-negative values of Index); 0 for Losers (negative values of Index). Growth rates expressed in percentage points/100 (1=100%). CDFs and difference in CDFs computed over the common support of ICT funds per pupil, for treated and non-treated.
